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OPINION OF THE COURT
_____________________
HUYETT, District Judge:
Appellant Dennis Felton was a tax examining assistant
with the Automated Collection Service ("ACS") of the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS").

He was responsible for, among other

things, contacting taxpayers with regard to collecting delinquent
income tax payments.
opportunity

to

settle

payments to him.

Felton offered delinquent taxpayers the
tax

debts

with

the

IRS

for

personal

He was convicted of one count of demand and

acceptance of a bribe by a public official and five counts of
unlawful gratuity demanded and sought by a public official.
Felton appeals his sentence on three grounds.

First,

Felton argues that the district court erred in adjusting his
offense level upward by two levels pursuant to United States
Sentencing Guideline section 3B1.1 for being a leader, organizer,
manager, or supervisor of a criminal activity.

Second, he argues

that the district court erred in departing from the Sentencing
Guidelines to make a one-level upward adjustment.

Third, he

argues that the district court made a mathematical error in its
computation of his offense level that caused it to find him
ineligible for a decrease in his offense level authorized by
section
Felton's

3E1.1

of

third

the

Sentencing

contention

and

Guidelines.
vacate

the

We

district

judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing.
I.

agree

Factual and Procedural Background

with

court's

In early September 1992, while working for the IRS,
Felton

received

a

telephone

call

from

a

Colonia,

New

Jersey

taxpayer concerning approximately $22,000 she owed in taxes in
connection with her 1990 Form 1040.

In response to her inquiry

as to whether she could be excused from penalties and interest on
the money she owed, Felton telephoned her and told her that if
she paid him, he would "take care of business."

He arranged a

meeting at a mall in New Jersey, where he told her that in
exchange for a personal payment of $8,000, he would close the
collection action, abate all penalties and interest, and arrange
for the return of approximately $13,000 to her.

Subsequently,

she contacted the IRS Office of the Regional Inspector concerning
this incident and participated in a controlled investigation.

At

an October 6, 1992 meeting, the taxpayer paid Felton $2000 and
Felton told her that he wanted to receive the balance of the
bribe

payment

when

she

received

the

refund

check.

The

ACS

received a return with falsified information, and in June 1993,
the taxpayer received a refund check for $24,805.44.

Felton was

arrested on July 14, 1993 after he demanded and received the
remaining $6,000 payment.
On Felton's arrest, he advised the authorities that his
co-worker, Walter Clark, actually amended the return for the
taxpayer and that Clark was to share equally in the payments.
Felton needed Clark or some other person to participate in the
schemes because Felton is legally blind and cannot alter tax
returns alone.

Following Felton's arrest, agents reviewed the

files Felton and Clark handled and investigated the five other

frauds

for

which

Felton

was

convicted.

With

Felton's

cooperation, the authorities investigated Clark's involvement in
the schemes and prosecuted him for his involvement in one fraud.
In the five incidents for which Felton was convicted of
demanding

a

gratuity,

Felton

sought

payments

to

prepare

returns or resolve tax penalties or other tax problems.

tax

In some

instances, he offered to reduce their individual tax liabilities
and generate refunds in exchange for payments to him.

In other

instances, he solicited taxpayers by offering to amend their
income tax returns and cause refunds to issue in exchange for
payments to him.

In several instances, he demanded and took

money from taxpayers without performing services.

In two frauds,

involving taxpayers from Englewood, New Jersey and Mount Holly,
New Jersey, Felton contacted taxpayers after they called the IRS
to resolve their tax problems.

The Mount Holly taxpayers later

referred Felton as a tax adviser to their friends and relatives,
which led to frauds against taxpayers in Burlington Township, New
Jersey, Williamstown, New Jersey, and Budd Lake, New Jersey.

The

Mount Holly, Burlington Township, Williamstown, and Budd Lake
taxpayers claimed that they did not know Felton was an IRS agent.
On April 22, 1994, Felton entered a guilty plea to an
information charging him with one count of "demand and acceptance
of

bribe

by

public

official,"

in

violation

of

18

U.S.C.

§

201(b)(2), and five counts of "unlawful gratuity demanded and
sought

by

public

201(c)(1)(B).
In

the

official,"

in

violation

of

18

U.S.C.

§

A sentencing hearing was held on July 11, 1994.

judgment,

subsequently

filed

on

July

20,

1994,

the

district

court

applications

adopted
in

("presentence

the

the

report"

factual

findings

Presentence

or

"PSR")

and

Guideline

Investigation

except

App. 115 (Judgment, July 20, 1994).

for

three

Report

paragraphs.

Thus, the record reviewed

includes the presentence report, the court's oral explanation of
its decision at the hearing, and the judgment order.
At

the

sentencing

base

offense

level

"Offering,

Giving,

Soliciting,

calculated
2C1.1,

a

hearing,
of

the

ten,

pursuant

or

Extortion Under Color of Official Right."

district

court

to section

Receiving

a

Bribe;

As recommended in the

presentence report, pursuant to subsection 3B1.1(c), the court
raised the offense level by two levels because Felton played an
aggravating role in the offense.

The court also considered the

specific offense characteristics provisions of section 2C1.1(b).
First, the court adopted the probation office's calculation of a
$31,295.44 loss attributable to Felton and increased the offense
level by four levels because the aggregate harm exceeded $20,000,
pursuant to subsection 2C.1.1(b)(2).

Second, the district court

rejected the probation officer's calculations and agreed with
Felton

that

increase

although

for

the

multiple

Guidelines

gratuities

authorized

or

a

multiple

two-level

bribes,

the

Guidelines did not authorize an increase when there was just one
bribe,

but

multiple

gratuities.

The

court,

however,

used

Felton's argument to depart from the Guidelines to increase the
offense
report

level

by

recommended

one
a

level.

Next,

three-level

although

decrease

for

the

presentence

acceptance

of

responsibility pursuant to section 3E1.1, the court granted only

a two-level decrease.

The court believed that by not imposing

the two-level increase for multiple bribes, the offense level
prior to the operation of subsection 3E1.1(a) was 15, and not 16
or

greater,

offense

which

level

for

would

have

timely

permitted

providing

another

decrease

information

in

concerning

involvement in offense or timely notifying authorities of his
intention to enter a plea of guilty.
granted

a

one-level

downward

Finally, the district court
departure,

following

the

government's section 5K1.1 motion.
In summary, the district court's modification of the
presentence report yielded an offense level of 14.

The following

calculation reflects the order in which the offense level should
be

calculated,

pursuant

to

the

application

section 1B1.1:
Base offense level, § 2C1.1(a)
Specific offense characteristics, § 2C1.1(b)
More than one gratuity or bribe
Aggregate harm more than $20,000
Aggravating role in the offense, § 3B1.1(c)
Acceptance of responsibility, § 3E1.1(a)
Additional adjustment for acceptance of
responsibility, § 3E1.1(b)
Upward Departure from § 2C1.1
Downward departure, § 5K1.1

instructions

of

10
0
+ 4
+ 2
- 2
0
+ 1
- 1

Total Offense Level =

14

For an offense level of 14, the Guidelines prescribe a sentence
within the range of 15 to 21 months.
district

court

sentenced

Felton

to

USSG Ch. 5, Pt. A.
15

months

on

the

The

bribery

charge and 15 months on each of the gratuities charges, each to
be served concurrently.
II.

Discussion

We have appellate jurisdiction over this appeal from
the final decision of the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291.

The district court had subject matter jurisdiction in this

criminal matter.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3231.

We review the district

court's factual findings in relation to sentencing issues for
clear error.

United States v. Fields, 39 F.3d 439, 447 (3d Cir.

1994); United States v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659, 663 (3d Cir. 1993);
United States v. Belletiere, 971 F.2d 961, 964 (3d Cir. 1992).

A

finding is clearly erroneous, if, after reviewing all of the
evidence, we are left with the firm conviction that a mistake has
been made.

Belletiere, 971 F.2d at 969.

Our review with respect

to the district court's application and interpretation of the
Sentencing Guidelines is plenary.

Id. at 964; United States v.

Bogusz, 43 F.3d 82, 85 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Murillo,
933 F.2d 195, 197 (3d Cir. 1991).
Guidelines
standard

presents
and

scope

a

mixed
of

When the application of the

question

review

takes

of
on

law

and

fact,

greater

"our

scrutiny,

approaching de novo as the issue moves from one of strictly fact
to one of strictly law."

Belletiere, 971 F.2d at 964 (quoting

Murillo, 933 F.2d at 198).
A.

Adjustment for Aggravating Role
We first address Felton's argument that the district

court's two-level increase for Felton's aggravating role in the
offense was in err.

The pertinent portion of section 3B1.1 of

the Guidelines provides:
Based on the defendant's role in the offense,
increase the offense level as follows: . . .
(c) If the defendant was an organizer,

leader,
manager,
or
supervisor
in
any
criminal activity other than described in (a)
or (b), increase by 2 levels.
USSG § 3B1.1.1

Section 3B1.1 requires the district court to find

that "the defendant exercised control over at least one other
United States v. Katora, 981 F.2d 1398, 1402 (3d Cir.

person."
1992).

See also USSG § 3B1.1, comment. (n.2) ("the defendant

must have been the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of
one or more other participants").
Felton

takes

issue

with

the

district

court's

determination that he was a leader in criminal activity.

This

determination is essentially factual, therefore, we reverse the
district court only if its conclusion was clearly erroneous.
Fields, 39 F.3d at 447; United States v. Phillips, 959 F.2d 1187,
1191 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 497, 121
L. Ed. 2d 434 (1992); United States v. Ortiz, 878 F.2d 125, 127
(3d Cir. 1989).
The

presentence

report

mentions

Clark

in

connection

with three of the six incidents for which Felton was convicted,
although Clark was only charged with and convicted of one fraud.
Neither

Felton

nor

the

government

objected

to

the

facts

as

presented by the probation office with regard to these three
incidents.
taxpayer,
1

With regard to the bribery concerning the Colonia
Felton

offered

to

arrange

the

return

of taxes

she

. Subsections (a) and (b) concern situations where the
defendant was a leader, organizer, manager, or supervisor of
criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was
otherwise extensive.

already paid to the IRS for a personal payment to him, Felton
requested that the check be payable to him, and Felton requested
documentation relating to her mortgage, sale of her home, and her
profit sharing plan.

Felton also scheduled meetings with her and

agreed to adjust her current and past tax returns, Felton told
the taxpayer how to make payments, and Felton personally accepted
$6,000 in cash from the taxpayer.

Clark, along with Felton and

other Tax Examining Assistants, extended her account suspension.
Clark also amended the taxpayer's income tax return, received
$1,000 for this service, and Felton promised him another $3,000
after payment of the balance owed by her.
With respect to the Englewood taxpayer, Felton's first
contact with the taxpayer was through the IRS toll free telephone
number.

Felton later contacted her to assist her with her tax

problems,

Felton

requested

money

in

exchange

for

purported

services, and Felton received payments from this taxpayer.

Clark

only attended meetings at her residence with Felton.
With respect to the Mount Holly taxpayers, after the
taxpayers

had

made

numerous

telephone

representatives, Felton contacted them.

contacts

could

prepare

and

submit

their

with

IRS

income

He told them that he
tax

returns

using

information they provided, Felton denied that any illegality was
involved, and Felton was paid by the taxpayers.

According to the

presentence report, Clark met one of the taxpayers with Felton,
amended the tax return, and got some portion of the payment
received by Felton.

The probation officer summarized their involvement and
offenses as follows:
26.
Felton made all initial and subsequent
contacts with the victim's [sic] of this
offense. He made preliminary judgments as to
feasibility of amending their returns, and
made the arrangements to gather necessary
information from the victims to be used in
amending the returns.
He solicited the
assistance
of
Walter
Clark,
who
was
responsible for amending some or all of the
returns, in exchange for payment by Felton,
and presumably provided Clark with the
information
necessary
for
amendment.
Pursuant
to
3B1.1(c),
Felton
was
the
organizer of the offense.
27.
Clark's role was in assistance to
Felton, such as transporting Felton to
meetings with the victims, and taking notes
during the meetings.
While Clark was
responsible for actually amending the returns
themselves, his assistance was solicited by
Felton, by whom Clark was paid. Pursuant to
3B1.2(b), Clark was a minor participant in
the offense.
PSR

¶¶

26-27.

paragraphs,

Neither

although

party

they

specifically

both

objected

objected

to

to

probation

the

these

officer's characterization of Felton as an organizer in other
parts of the presentence report.

The court, however, considered

Felton the leader, stating:
There is no question that he should get the
two point enhancement under 3B1.1(c).
Mr.
Felton's sentence should reflect his conduct
without reference to whatever sentence Clark
got and why.
Under 3B1.1(c), Mr. Felton in
my judgment was clearly the organizer,
leader, manager of this criminal activity.
He recruited Clark and, I suggest, others.
App. at 85 (Transcript).

"When a person manages or supervises another in the
course of a criminal enterprise, the manager or supervisor will
normally be more culpable than the person managed or supervised."
United States v. Fuentes, 954 F.2d 151, 153 (3d Cir. 1992).

"The

direction and control of others is a recurrent theme in legal
definitions of the terms 'manager' and 'supervisor.'"
States v. King, 21 F.3d 1302, 1305 (3d Cir. 1994).

United

The record

supporting the district court's conclusion that Felton was the
organizer,

leader,

manager,

especially

considering

that

or

supervisor

at

the

is

not

sentencing,

extensive,

neither

the

prosecution nor the defense thought the increase was appropriate.
However, several uncontested facts in the presentence report do
tend

to

support

the

district

court's

played a supervisory role over Clark.

conclusion

performed much of the menial work of the scheme:
meetings

with

the

victims,

he

Felton

First, Felton made all

initial contacts with the victims of the fraud.

to

that

took

Second, Clark
he drove Felton

notes

during

those

meetings, and he was given the responsibility of amending the
victims' tax returns.

While Felton's blindness -- and inability

to perform these tasks -- no doubt diminishes the import of those
tasks to determining Clark's role, we think that they do evidence
the fact that Felton had at least some authority over Clark to
have Clark do his bidding.

Finally, the fact that Felton was

involved

than

in

more

incidents

Clark

supports

the

district

court's conclusion that it was Felton's scheme to begin with and
that Felton "recruited Clark" to work for him.

The evidence

concerning their individual roles in the offense was sufficient

record evidence for the district court to conclude that Felton
was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor, even though
Clark did not participate in every scheme.

The district court's

finding was not clearly erroneous.
B.

Departure from the Guidelines
We next consider Felton's argument that the district

court erred in departing from the Sentencing Guidelines to adjust
his offense level upward by one level.

Generally, the district

court must sentence a defendant within the applicable guideline
range.

However, when "the court finds that there exists an

aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree,
not

adequately

taken

into

consideration

by

the

Sentencing

Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a
sentence different from that described" the court may depart from
the guideline range.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).

See also United

States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1408 (3d Cir. 1994); United
States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1098 (3d Cir. 1990).
We review the district court's decision according to
the model set forth in United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084.
First, we determine whether the circumstances upon which the
district court relied to justify the departure were adequately
considered by the Sentencing Commission.
fold

inquiry:

we

exercise

plenary

This requires a two-

review

over

the

district

court's determination that the Guidelines do not adequately take
a particular factor into consideration, Kikumura, 918 F.2d at
1098, and we apply a clearly erroneous standard of review to
determine

whether

the

facts

support

the

sentencing

court's

rationale.

United States v. Seale, 20 F.3d 1279, 1287 (3d Cir.

1994); Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1098.

Second, we must determine

whether the sentence imposed was reasonable.
two-fold inquiry:

This also demands a

we consider whether the factors on which the

court relied were appropriate and whether the degree of departure
was appropriate.
Cir. 1989).

United States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604, 610 (3d

In this determination, we permit the district courts

to exercise a substantial amount of discretion.
at 1408; Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1098.

Bertoli, 40 F.3d

We address each issue in

turn.
Adequate Consideration by the Sentencing Commission

We

must

Commission

1.

took

first
adequate

determine

whether

consideration

of

the
the

Sentencing
aggravating

circumstance upon which the district court relied.

In this case,

the factual basis for departure was not disputed.

The district

court found that Felton accepted one bribe and five gratuities.
The

district

court

reasoned

that

the

magnitude

of

Felton's

schemes was an aggravating factor that the Sentencing Commission
did not adequately consider.
The district court is permitted to examine only the
Sentencing Guidelines, the policy statements, and the official
commentary of the Guidelines to determine whether the Sentencing
Commission adequately considered this aggravating factor.

18

U.S.C. § 3553(b); Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1104.2
2

. To minimize confusion in the arguments Felton advances, we
briefly explain the Guideline sections applied. The Sentencing
Guidelines require the district court to group together all
counts involving substantially the same harm. USSG § 3D1.2. The

Section 2C1.1 requires a two-level increase in offense
level,

"[i]f

extortion."

the

offense

involved

USSG § 2C1.1(b)(1).

more

than

one

bribe

or

Section 2C1.2, which would have

applied had their been no bribes, requires a two-level increase
"[i]f the offense involved more than one gratuity."
2C1.2(b)(1).

USSG §

The Guidelines, the policy statements, and the

official commentary of the Sentencing Commission do not mention
that an increase is available to raise the offense level for one
bribe and multiple gratuities.

See § 2C1.1(b)(1).

The court's analysis of this issue was not extensive.
While

making

objections

to

the

presentence

report,

Felton's

counsel argued that the Guidelines do not permit the court to
aggregate one bribe with multiple gratuities to increase the
offense level by two levels because then the gratuities would be
treated as bribes.
and

used

this

The court appeared to accept this argument

argument

to

justify

its

departure

from

the

Guidelines. An exchange concerning this issue was as follows:
MR. KELLER:
I'm saying that it's totally
improper to start aggregating one bribe with
certain
gratuities
and
lump
all
these
gratuities, all of a sudden to become bribes.
. . .
THE COURT:
Well, suppose I don't give him
those two points. Look, at the rate you're
going I'm going to have to give him a
present.
(..continued)
counts of bribery and gratuities must be grouped together. §
3D1.2(d). Because these counts involve offenses of the same
general type, the court must apply the offense guideline that
produces the highest offense level. § 3D1.3(b). Because the
bribery provision, § 2C1.1, produces a higher offense level than
the gratuity provision, § 2C1.2, the bribery guideline is used.

You know, I'm not going to buy this
argument, though I'll tell you I am not going
to not count five counts on which he accepted
an illegal gratuity. So even if you're right
on the law here, it would certainly be an
appropriate ground for an upward departure.
Right? You couldn't disagree with that.
MR. KELLER:

Well --

THE COURT:
Because this is conduct which
would not otherwise be counted. So I mean I
don't know, which way do you want me to go on
that?
App. at 78-79 (Transcript).

After a recess, the court explained

its departure from the Guidelines as follows:
I am going to grant Mr. Keller's objection to
the -- what is it, 2C1.1 bribery or extortion
language. This is very complicated. I think
I could make an argument that because one is
referred under the gratuity statute to 2C1.1,
and that language of bribery or extortion,
that perhaps Mr. Keller's argument should be
rejected. But I'm not clear enough on it to
say. It is just too murky. So I'm going to
take off those two points.
That does not quite end the issue
though.
Because by taking off those two
points, Mr. Felton is no longer eligible for
the
additional
point
on
acceptance
of
responsibility. Because he's down into a -what's it, a 15 instead of a 16. So all of
that having been said, that's not to say Mr.
Keller, because I told you I would, I'm going
to give you the two points on that particular
objection.
But I will upward depart and I
will upward depart one level to compensate
for the one level that is being lost on the
acceptance of responsibility, third point.
App. at 85-86 (emphasis added) (Transcript).
In the judgment order, the court explained its basis
for the upward departure as follows:

Because one bribery and five gratuities were
not aggregated to receive the 2 level
increase under 2C1.1, the gratuities would
not be punished absent an upward departure, a
circumstance
not
adequately
taken
into
consideration by the Commission.
App. at 114 (Judgment).
We reject Felton's argument that the multiple count
provisions, found in Chapter Three, Part D of the Sentencing
Guidelines, make clear that the Sentencing Commission considered
the

impact

process

and

of

multiple

believed

count

that

convictions

certain

on

offenses

the
were

sentencing
so

closely

intertwined that they should not receive any increase under the
Guidelines.

As explained by the Sentencing Commission in its

introductory commentary to the multiple count provisions:
Some offense guidelines, such as those for
theft, fraud and drug offenses, contain
provisions that deal with repetitive or
ongoing behavior. Other guidelines, such as
those for assault and robbery, are oriented
more toward single episodes of criminal
behavior.
Accordingly, different rules are
required for dealing with multiple-count
convictions involving these two different
general classes of offenses.
USSG Ch. 3, Pt. D, intro. comment.

The Sentencing Commission

explicitly authorized a two-level increase in offense level for
multiple

bribes

in

section

2C1.1

and

a

similar

multiple unlawful gratuities in section 2C1.2.

increase for

Thus, despite the

multiple count provisions, the Sentencing Commission approved an
increase in offense level for multiple bribes or gratuities, as
compared to single instances of a bribe or a gratuity.

The

Sentencing

Commission

authorized

an

increase

in

offense level for six bribes or six gratuities, but not for a
combination of one bribe and five gratuities.
Guidelines,

the

commentary,

and

the

The Sentencing

background

notes

do

not

indicate that the Sentencing Commission believed that this type
of repeated unlawful conduct involving a bribe and gratuities
should be treated less harshly than repeated unlawful conduct
involving only bribes or only gratuities.

Thus, it appears that

the Sentencing Commission did not consider this result.
2.

Reasonableness of the Adjustment

We

also

must

consider

whether

upward adjustment was reasonable.
Review is deferential.

the

district

court's

Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1110.

Id. at 1098.

To determine whether the

sentence was reasonable, we consider the factors set forth in 18
U.S.C.

§

3553(a)

and

the

reasons

for

the

imposition

of

the

particular sentence as stated by the district court, pursuant to
section

3553(c).

18

U.S.C.

Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1098.

§

3742

(Review

of

a

sentence);

We consider "whether the factors

relied on are appropriate; and whether the degree of departure
was

appropriate."

quotations omitted).
occasioning
relevant

or

to

Kikumura,

F.2d

at

1098

(internal

"In order to be 'appropriate,' a factor

contributing

the

918

defendant's

to

an

upward

culpability."

departure
United

must

be

States

v.

Schweitzer, 5 F.3d 44, 48 (3d Cir. 1993).
The
appropriate.

factors

upon

which

the

court

relied

were

The fact that Felton accepted multiple gratuities

is relevant to his culpability because the Sentencing Guidelines

already

meted

increased

punishment

for

public

officials

accepted multiple bribes or multiple gratuities.
pursuant

to

the

Guidelines

would

have

been

who

To sentence
equivalent

to

sentencing Felton for one bribe greater than $20,000 without
reflecting

the

Furthermore,

multitude

the

degree

of

gratuities

of

departure

demanded
was

or

accepted.

appropriate.

The

increase in the offense level was no greater than the increase
that would have been required for acceptance of two gratuities,
had there been no bribery charges.

Thus, we find no error in the

court's upward departure.
C.

Reduction for Acceptance of Responsibility
Finally,

we

consider

Felton's

argument

that

the

district court erred in its computation of his offense level,
which caused the district court to find him ineligible for a
third

decrease

in

his

offense

level

which

section 3E1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines.
decreased

Felton's

subsection 3E1.1(a).

offense

level

by

two

was

authorized

by

The district court
levels,

pursuant

to

Felton argues that he should have received

an additional one-level decrease pursuant to subsection 3E1.1(b).
Section 3E1.1 provides as follows:
(a) If the defendant clearly demonstrates
acceptance of responsibility for his offense,
decrease the offense level by 2 levels.
(b) If the defendant qualifies for a decrease
under subsection (a), the offense level
determined
prior
to
the
operation
of
subsection (a) is level 16 or greater, and
the defendant has assisted authorities in the
investigation or prosecution of his own
misconduct by taking one or more of the
following steps:

(1)
timely
providing
complete
information to the government concerning
his own involvement in the offense; or
(2) timely notifying authorities of his
intention to enter a plea of guilty,
thereby permitting the government to
avoid preparing for trial and permitting
the court to allocate its resources
efficiently,
decrease the offense level by 1 additional level.
USSG § 3E1.1.

The district court is particularly well suited to

evaluate a defendant's acceptance of responsibility.

Therefore,

its determination can only be reversed if we find it was clearly
erroneous.

United States v. Pardo, 25 F.3d 1187, 1193 (3d Cir.

1994).
Felton argues that the district court failed to grant
him a reduction of one level pursuant to subsection 3E1.1(b)
because it thought that he had an offense level of only 15
instead of 16.

The transcript of the sentencing hearing and the

ensuing judgment support this argument.

Prior to the operation

of subsection 1B1.1(a), Felton's offense level was sixteen, based
on a base offense level of ten, a four-level increase for loss
greater than $20,000, and a two-level increase for Felton's role
as organizer.

The court, however, said with respect to this

issue:
[B]y taking off those two points, Mr. Felton
is no longer eligible for the additional
point
on
acceptance
of
responsibility.
Because he's down into a -- what's it, a 15
instead of a 16. So all of that having been
said, that's not to say Mr. Keller, because I
told you I would, I'm going to give you the
two points on that particular objection.

App. at 107 (Transcript).

The court repeated this reasoning in

the judgment as follows:
2C1.1 states that if the offense involved
more than one "bribe or extortion" increase
by 2 levels.
The offense here involved one
bribe and five gratuities.
Because it is
unclear whether this aggregate behavior can
receive the 2 level increase, the two level
increase was deleted.
As a result, the
additional
adjustment
for
acceptance
of
responsibility in paragraph 46 was deleted as
well.
App.

at

error.3

115

(Judgment).

The

court's

explanation

was

clear

The government argues that Felton was not granted the

additional one-level reduction because the district court could
have made independent findings of fact that Felton failed to
assist authorities.
such findings.
that

the

The only evidence of Felton's failure to assist

government

government's

The district court, however, never made any

counsel

can
that

find

is

Felton

an

offhand

embellished

remark
certain

by

the

facts

surrounding the offense in the course of aiding the authorities.
3

. The government maintains that Felton never objected to the
district court's refusal to give a three-level reduction and
accordingly waived his right to appeal unless the mistake was
plain error. United States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78, 88 (3d Cir.
1992) (sentencing disputes reviewed for plain error where
defendant fails to object in the district court but finding that
the miscalculation in that case was plain error), cert. denied,
___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 2332, 124 L. Ed.2d 244 (1993). Under a
plain error standard, the court is concerned only with errors
that seriously affect substantial rights or compromise the
fairness of the proceedings. Id. This circuit and others have
found that the miscalculation of a defendant's offense level
"certainly is error that seriously affect[s] [the defendant's]
rights, and so amounts to plain error." Id. at 90; United States
v. Moss, 9 F.3d 543, 553 (6th Cir. 1993) (application of clearly
incorrect base level offense deemed clear error); United States
v. Plaza-Garza, 914 F.2d 345, 348 (1st Cir. 1990).

The district court never referred to this comment, nor did it
explicitly

find

that

Felton

failed

to

assist.

The

district

court's reason for denying the third offense level decrease for
acceptance of responsibility was clear error.

We remand the case

for resentencing on this issue.
III.

Conclusion

In summary, we hold that the district court's reason
for

denying

an

additional

decrease

for

acceptance

of

responsibility was clear error.

The court did not err, however,

in

leader,

finding

that

Felton

was

a

organizer,

manager,

or

supervisor, nor did the court err in departing upward one level
in sentencing Felton.
court's

judgment

instructions

for

Accordingly, we will vacate the district

and
the

order
district

accord with this opinion.

of

sentence

court

to

and

remand

resentence

with

Felton

in

